Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

4-21-2011

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green
Consumers and Responsible Firms: A
Comparative
Nicola Doni
Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Firenze, nicola.doni@unifi.it

Giorgio Ricchiuti
Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Firenze

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem
Recommended Citation
Doni, Nicola and Ricchiuti, Giorgio, "Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A
Comparative" (April 21, 2011). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 582.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper582

This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2011 by the author(s).

Doni and Ricchiuti: Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Re

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green
Consumers and Responsible Firms: a Comparative
Statics Analysis∗
Nicola Doni†

Giorgio Ricchiuti‡
February, 2011

Abstract
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1

Introduction

In the late years a growing body of the environmental economics literature has
been devoted to the analysis of the so called third generation instruments for the
control of pollution. Indeed, the classic command and control approach can be
substituted, or integrated, not only by economic instruments (as taxes, subsidies
and tradable permits) but also by the voluntary market choices of environmentally
aware agents.1 However, the current debate is far from a complete understanding of the actual capabilities of individual and firm responsibility as a means to
effectively promote environmental protection (see Bénabou and Tirole, 2010).
In many sectors firms try to increase their market share by advertising their
production as environment-friendly. As noted by Kotchen (2005) and Besley
and Ghatak (2007), environment-friendly goods can be viewed as impure public
goods, in which private and public characteristics are bundled together. As emphasized by Bagnoli and Watts (2003), the form of this bundling can be explicit or
implicit. The first case corresponds to situations in which firms improve the environmental quality of the good they provide and, consequently, they increase their
marginal costs of production. On the other hand, the second case corresponds
to situations in which firms sustain environmental programs whose benefits and
costs are not proportional to their sales.
There is a large evidence that many consumers are willing to pay a price premium to purchase environment-friendly goods. The premium paid represents a
form of voluntary contribution to the provision of a public good. In the economic
literature there are different ways to reconcile this behavior with the traditional
assumption of self-interested agents. A first attempt is based on the assumption
that green consumers obtain a direct utility by the environmental qualities of the
goods they buy. In this view green consumers derive a warm glow from their
responsible action (Andreoni, 1990), due to social approval or to their internal
moral motivation. On the other hand, we could think that green consumers behave as conditional cooperator, who accept to sacrifice their utility conditional
on expectations that others will do the same. Indeed, many authors (e.g. Ostrom,
2000) emphasized that in the presence of social dilemmas, if all the individuals
seek to maximize their egoistic interest, they are unavoidably trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium. For this reason truly rational agents can choose to switch
to more refined choice criteria. We do not deepen this problem in our paper, but
when we carry out the welfare analysis we choose to explore only the influence
1

See Khanna, 2001, for a good survey on this historical evolution.
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of responsible choices on the efficiency of the environmental protection activity,
disregarding their consequences in terms of consumers’ surplus. Indeed, the calculation of consumers’ surplus requires a clear cut definition of consumers’ utility.
The economic literature traditionally has analyzed the green consumers phenomenon in the framework of vertically differentiated markets. A first group of
paper focused on how the presence of green consumers interacts with the optimal
environmental policy (see Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Cremer and Thisse,
1999; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Bansal and Gangopadhyay,
2003; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005). A second group dealt with the impact of a
higher consumers’ consciousness on the market equilibrium and the associated
social welfare. Frequently the results of these models warn against a naive confidence in consumers’ responsibility as a solution to environmental problems. Indeed, rarely the market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers approximates the maximization of social welfare (see Eriksson, 2004; Conrad, 2005).
Moreover, some authors showed that it cannot be taken for granted that a higher
level of consumers’ responsibility is always associate to less pollution and higher
welfare2 (Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2009).
Our paper can be considered as an extension of the vertically differentiated
duopoly put forward by Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009). They assume
that consumers have a different willingness to pay (hereafter WTP) for "clean"
products and they study how an increase in their aggregate WTP affects the market
equilibrium. As far as the production technology is concerned, they assume that
the costs and the benefits of the abatement activity are increasing and convex in
the level of clean-up and independent of the level of production. This assumption
covers the case in which firms devote lump-sum expenditures to environmental
protection activities not directly associated to their production of the private good.
However there are cases in which the benefits and the costs of the abatement activity are proportional to the quantity produced, as happens when firms improve the
environmental quality of their production process.3 So a first extension consists
in repeating their analysis under a different assumption regarding the technology
associated to the provision of the public good.
Moreover, the main novelty of our paper is that we allow firms to choose their
2

Similar conclusions are reached in a different framework by Calveras et al. (2007). They
consider a model in which citizens first vote the minimum environmental standard and then buy
a good produced in perfectly competitive markets. According to their analysis, a higher level of
activism in the society may imply a higher level of pollution.
3
Many existing models adopt this assumption. See for instance Cremer and Thisse (1999),
Eriksson (2004), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Conrad (2005) and Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007).
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market strategy in accordance with an objective function that may not coincide
with profit maximization. Indeed, in some markets, especially when the good
traded is an impure public good, we can observe competition between firms with
different aims. For instance, standard for profit firms may compete with nonprofit firms, whose main objective is the maximization of the positive externality
associated to their production.4
Recently many firms spend a lot of efforts in order to persuade consumers that
their behavior is socially responsible. However, there is not a general consensus
with regard to the exact concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We report two polar definitions that can appear in sharp contrast.5 According to a first
point of view, a firm is socially responsible when it takes environment-friendly
actions not required by law. In this light, CSR can be defined without any regard
neither to the motivation of the firm’s choices nor to the impact of such choices
on the firm’s profit. However, many authors believe that a firm is truly responsible
only when it sacrifices its profit, at least in part, in order to carry out some social
objective. Baron (2001) names the first behavior as strategic CSR and the second
one as altruistic CSR.
In all the existing models regarding the influence of green consumers on the
market equilibrium, firms are assumed to behave as standard profit maximizers.
Consequently the current literature explores only the effect of the interaction between green consumers and firms engaged in strategic CSR. We propose a more
general approach in which firms’ objective function weighs together their profit
and the social impact of their actions. In this view, firms’ degree of CSR can be
interpreted as the relative weight they assign to the second objective. Our purpose
is to study the market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers and firms
engaged in altruistic CSR. More specifically this work aims at analyzing
1. if a higher level of responsibility of both consumers and producers is always
associated to a more efficient result in terms of pollution control;
2. if a full responsibility of both producers and consumers is sufficient to attain
the first best level of pollution.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
present the general model and introduce the concepts of green consumers and
4

Becchetti and Huybrechts (2007) interpret in this way the Fair Trade sector.
An interesting debate over this issue can be found in the first volume of the Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. In particular, see Lyon and Maxwell (2008) and Reinhardt et al.
(2008).
5
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responsible firms. In Section 3 we characterize the market equilibrium in the case
in which the costs and the benefits of the cleaning technology are fixed (i.e.: independent of the quantity produced). In Section 4 we extend the same kind of
analysis to the alternative case in which the costs and the benefits of clean-up
are assumed to be proportional to the quantity produced. In both these sections
we examine how changes in consumers’ or firms’ social responsibility affect the
efficiency of the aggregate abatement activity in equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.

2
2.1

The general model
The technology

There is a physically homogeneous good, whose production generates pollution.
The production costs depend on both the quantity produced, x, and the level of
the abatement activity, e. Formally, the cost function for a generic firm i is:
k 2 γ
e x , ∀i = 1, ..., n,
(1)
2 i i
where k is a constant and γ indicates how the quantity produced affects the abatement costs. Specifically, γ can assume two values: zero when the abatement costs
are fixed, and one when these costs are variable.
The total emissions for a single firm are:
Ci (ei ) =

Yi (ei ) = ēxi − ei xγi ,

∀i = 1, ..., n;

(2)

ē is the unitary level of emissions without clean-up activity. We assume that when
the abatement costs are fixed, γ = 0, then the clean-up activity of a generic firm
i is independent of xi . In this case, according to the definition introduced by
Bagnoli and Watts (2003), the private provision of the public good "abatement" is
only implicitly linked to sales of the private good. On the other hand, when the
abatement costs are variable, γ = 1, the clean-up activity of firm i is proportional
to xi . This case corresponds to a situation in which the provision of the public
good
Pn and of the private good are explicitly linked. Finally, let us define Y =
i=1 Yi the aggregate emissions.

2.2

The social welfare

Polluting emissions represent an externality, affecting negatively the consumers’
utility. We normalize the consumers’ population to a unit mass and we assume
5
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that every unit of emission reduces the utility of a generic
  consumer by ρ, which
is distributed according to F (ρ) over the support 0, ρ̄ , where F (0) = 0 and
F (ρ̄) = 1. As a consequence,
the social benefits of the clean-up activity
is equal
R
Pn
γ
T T
T
T
to ρ E where E = i=1 ei xi is the total abatement and ρ = ρdF (ρ) is its
marginal social benefit.
We identify the social welfare W with the efficiency of the environmental protection. Consequently W is defined as the difference between the social benefits
associated to the aggregate abatement activity and its total costs:

n 
X
k
2
T
W =
ρ ei − (ei ) xγi .
2
i=1

(3)

Hence, the maximization of the social welfare entails that the first best level
of clean-up of each firm is:
FB

e

ρT
=
,
k

∀i = 1, ..., n,

(4)

which does not depend on the quantity produced. It is worth noting that whatever
the total abatement is, its cost effective allocation requires that firms’ marginal
costs coincide, implying that total abatement should be shared equally among
them.
We assume that the environmental regulator cannot force firms to adopt a positive level of clean-up. Consequently, if ρT is strictly higher than 0, then the public
good "abatement" is too scarce and responsible citizens can choose to voluntarily
contribute to its provision by producing or consuming more environment-friendly
goods.

2.3

The demand side

On the demand side, consumers are interested in buying only one unit of the good.
Mainly, a share 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of consumers’ population (labeled as green) takes into
account firms’ abatement efforts in choosing which product to buy, while all the
others consumers acts as (radical) free riders. We let the WTP of green consumers
be heterogeneous among them. Formally, a generic green consumer chooses a
product to maximize:6
6

We assume that each consumer takes the total emissions Y as exogenous because her individual contribution to pollution is negligible.

6
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H = V − p + θe − ρY,

(5)

where V is the (homogeneous) gross utility of consuming one unit of the product
and θ is the individual WTP for the marginal
in firms’ abatement, ash increase
i
sumed uniformly distributed in the interval 0, θ̄ .7 Therefore the total WTP for
more environment-friendly products, θT , is equal to

β θ̄
.
2

Let us define µ as:

θT
β θ̄
= T.
(6)
T
ρ
2ρ
This ratio can be considered as an index of the social capital of the consumers’
population because it represents how much their choices are driven by social rather
than individualistic motivations. We limit the aggregate consumers’ WTP to be
lower than their aggregate marginal disutility of emissions, i.e. θT is weakly lower
than ρT . Given this assumption, it follows that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1.
µ=

2.4

The supply side

On the supply side, following Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009), there is
the coexistence of two kinds of firms. On the one hand, a fringe of firms who
provide the good without employing any clean-up activity. Given that they sell
an homogenous product and compete à la Bertrand, they charge a price equal to
0 (the marginal cost of production when e = 0), and they do not achieve extra
profit. On the other hand, in the presence of green consumers, other firms can
choose to employ the cleaning technology in order to differentiate their product
and to obtain a strictly positive profit. We assume that there are only two firms
that are able to carry out this abatement activity. We use H and L to denote the
variables associated to the firms choosing the high and the low level of abatement.
Their profit is equal to:
k
πi = pi xi − e2i xγi ,
2
where xi represents firm’s i market share.

i = L, H,

(7)

7

We choose to pay attention only to the case in which the lowest WTP is 0 in order to simplify
our analysis of market equilibrium.

7
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These two firms are labeled as responsible because they overcomply the existing environmental regulation.8 However they can have a different willingness to
sacrifice their profit in order to increase their clean-up. Formally, we allow them
to have the following composite objective function that weighs the maximization
of their profit and the maximization of the positive externality associated to their
abatement activity:
Ji = πi

1−αi

ρT ei xγi

 αi

s.t.

πi ≥ 0,

i = L, H,

(8)

where αi ∈ [0, 1]. When αi = 0 we have the standard case of a profit-maximizer
firm; when αi = 1 we have the opposite case of a non-profit firm who simply
wants to maximize the positive impact of its clean-up under the constraint of nonnegative profit.9 In general, a responsible firm i pursues two different objectives
simultaneously and αi is a parameter signaling the relative importance of the two
criteria. More specifically, αi can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of
(altruistic) CSR of firm i.10

2.5

Firms’ competition

We model competition between the two responsible firms according to the usual
framework adopted in duopoly models of vertical differentiation. There are two
stages: in the first one, the two firms simultaneously choose the clean-up level,
that can be defined as the (environmental) quality of their product. In the second
8

As sustained by Kotchen (2009), environment-friendly innovations are frequently introduced
by eco-entrepreneurs where eco-entrepreneurship can be defined as "the practice of starting new
businesses in response to an identified opportunity to earn a profit and provide a positive environmental externality". So, the assumption regarding the existence of only two responsible producers
can be justified by noting that frequently innovation processes are driven by a limited number
of firms. Further research will be devoted to the analysis of the case in which the number of
responsible firms is endogenously determined by market competition.
9
We assume that when αi = 1 firm i maximizes the positive impact of its abatement activity
also if its profit is equal to 0.
10
As explained in De Donder and Roemer (2009), such objective can be interpreted as the
weighted Nash bargaining solution of an efficient negotiation between two different factions inside the firm: one aiming at maximizing profit and the other aiming at maximizing the positive
externality associated to firm’s production. Such interpretation is correct if i) the no agreement
pay-offs are (0, 0), as happens when a firm is part of the competitive fringe, that does not obtain
any extra-profit and does not produce any positive externality, ii) the objective function of each
faction is log-concave in firm’s strategic choices of p and e (for our case this property is proved
in the technical appendix). According to such interpretation, αi represents the relative negotiation
power of the faction supporting the abatement activity inside the firm i.

8
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stage the two firms observe the choice of their competitor and simultaneously
set the price. We know that when the lowest consumers’ WTP is equal to 0, in
equilibrium arises an uncovered market configuration (see Motta, 1993). This
means that in equilibrium a group of green consumers buys a standard good from
the competitive fringe.
The market share of each firm can be calculated by identifying θ̂, the indifferent consumer between purchasing from either the high or the low quality firm, and
θ̃, the indifferent consumer between buying either the low or the null quality prodL
uct. Straightforward algebra, using equation (5), it is easy to see that: θ̂ = peHH −p
−eL
and θ̃ = peLL . As known, in a vertically differentiated duopoly, the high (low) qualh i h i
ity firm sells to green consumers included in θ̂, θ̄
θ̃, θ̂ . Then each firm’s
market share is:




pH − pL
β pH − pL pL
β
θ̄ −
−
, xL =
, x0 = 1 − xH − xL , (9)
xH =
eH − eL
eL
θ̄
θ̄ eH − eL
where x0 is the total quantity sold by firms of the competitive fringe.
We apply the standard backward induction methodology by first analyzing the
price equilibrium and then the environmental quality equilibrium. In the following
sections we analyze separately the cases of fixed and variable costs.

3
3.1

Fixed Costs of Clean-up
The Market Equilibrium

In this section we study the case of variable costs of clean-up, i.e. γ = 0. By using
equations (7) and (8) we can specify the objective function of the responsible firms
as:
1−αi 
αi

k 2
T
ρ ei
s.t. πi ≥ 0, i = L, H.
(10)
Ji = pi xi − ei
2
It is worth noting that in case of fixed costs the generalization of the firms’
objective function has no consequence on the price-setting stage. Indeed, at the
second stage the abatement activity is considered as exogenous, and so the responsible firms choose their price strategy in order to maximize only their revenues,
whatever their degree of CSR is. So the price equilibrium can be found by solving
9
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simultaneously the revenue maximization of both firms. As shown in the existing
literature (Motta, 1993; Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995), at this stage the unique
Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
p∗H = 2θ̄eH
p∗L = θ̄eL

eH − eL
,
4eH − eL

eH − eL
,
4eH − eL

yielding profits:
πH = 4β θ̄e2H

(eH − eL )
k
− e2H ;
2
(4eH − eL )
2

(11)

k
(eH − eL )
− e2L .
(12)
2
(4eH − eL )
2
In order to identify the duopolists’ maximization problem at the first stage,
equations (11) and (12) are substituted in equation (10). The equilibrium levels
of clean-up corresponds to the solutions that solve simultaneously11 the following
unconstrained12 maximization problems:13
1−αH 

αH
k 2
T
2 (eH − eL )
− e
max 4β θ̄eH
ρ eH
;
eH
(4eH − eL )2 2 H

1−αL 
αL
k 2
(eH − eL )
T
− e
max β θ̄eH eL
ρ eL
.
eL
(4eH − eL )2 2 L
The first order conditions require:
πL = β θ̄eH eL

4e3 − (3 + 2αH )e2H eL + (2 − αH )eH e2L
2 − αH
∂JH
= 0 ⇔ β θ̄ H
=
keH ; (13)
∂eH
(4eH − eL )3
8
11

As explained by Motta (1993), the solutions of this system are only the candidate equilibrium
of the model. In the technical appendix we show that second order conditions hold, and consequently every solution represents effectively a local maximum. Moreover, we have checked that
the firm choosing the high (low) quality has no incentive to "leapfrog" the rival firm and itself
produce the lowest (highest) quality.
12
We neglect the constrain that the firms’ profit must be positive as we will verify that such
condition is always satisfied in equilibrium.
13
We use αH and αL to indicate the degree of CSR of the firms producing the high and the low
level of clean-up. However, it is important to emphasize that we do not restrict the relative size of
their degree of CSR.

10
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∂JL
4e3H − (7 − 2αL )e2H eL + αL eH e2L
2 − αL
= 0 ⇔ β θ̄
keL .
=
3
∂eL
(4eH − eL )
2

(14)

In order to study whether firms’ abatement activities are strategically substitutes or complements we have to investigate the sign of the following cross derivatives:
−8αH e2H + (10 − 12αH )eH eL + (2 − αH )e2L
∂ 2 JH
= 4β θ̄
;
∂eH ∂eL
(4eH − eL )4

(15)

(16 − 8αL )e2H + (14 − 12αL )eH eL − αL e2L
∂ 2 JL
= β θ̄eL
.
∂eL ∂eH
(4eH − eL )4

(16)

Straightforward, the cross derivatives of each firm’s objective function is decreasing in its own degree of CSR. However, the cross derivative of firm L (eq.
16) is always positive (given that αL ≤ 1): in equilibrium the optimal abatement
for the low quality firm is always increasing in the abatement chosen by its rival.
Conversely, the cross derivatives of firm H (eq. 15) is strictly positive for αH = 0,
while is strictly negative when αH = 1. Hence, the best response of the high quality firm can be both increasing and decreasing in the abatement level chosen by
its rival, depending on its degree of CSR (and on the equilibrium levels of firms’
abatement).
Following the definition of Bulow et al. (1985), if αH is quite low, then eH
and eL are strategic complements, while for higher values of αH , we have neither
strategic complementarity nor strategic substitutability at the second stage because
the slopes of the two reaction functions have different sign.
The solutions of the system given by equations (13) and (14) can be found
making the ratio between them. We obtain:14
4(2 − αH )λ3 − (46 − 20αL − 7αH + 2αL αH )λ2 +
+ (24 − 10αL + 16αH − 9αL αH )λ − 4(2 − αL )(2 − αH ) = 0,
where λ is equal to eeHL . λ can be interpreted as the degree of (environmental)
differentiation. This equation has a unique acceptable solution λ∗ = g(αH , αL ).
14

This equation is a generalization of equation (7) of Motta (1993, p. 117) to the case in which
firms aim at maximizing not only their profit but also the positive externality implicitly associated
to their production.

11
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In Figure 1 we show the three dimensional plot of λ∗ . It is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in αH (αL ), ∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1]: hence, the higher the degree
of CSR of the firm H (L) the higher (lower) the environmental differentiation.
It’s worth noting that λ∗ has a maximum in g(1, 0) = 8, 6164 and a minimum in
g(0, 1) = 2, 7452.
Figure 1: λ∗ = g(αH , αL )

Substituting eH with λ∗ eL in (14) we achieve the equilibrium level of clean-up
of both firms as a function of λ∗ , αL , β, θ̄, k:
e∗L =
e∗H =

λ∗ [4(λ∗ )2 − (7 − 2αL )λ∗ + αL ]
2β θ̄
;
(2 − αL )k
(4λ∗ − 1)3

2β θ̄
(λ∗ )2 [4(λ∗ )2 − (7 − 2αL )λ∗ + αL ]
.
(2 − αL )k
(4λ∗ − 1)3

By recalling the equations (4) and (6) and rearranging we obtain:
4µλ∗ [4(λ∗ )2 − (7 − 2αL )λ∗ + αL ] F B
e ;
(2 − αL )(4λ∗ − 1)3

(17)

4µ(λ∗ )2 [4(λ∗ )2 − (7 − 2αL )λ∗ + αL ] F B
e .
(2 − αL )(4λ∗ − 1)3

(18)

e∗L =
e∗H =

Trivially, if all consumers are radical free riders (i.e.: µ = 0), firms will not
employ a cleaning technology, whatever their objective function is. It’s worth
12
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noting that in this model in order to have an abatement activity in equilibrium the
presence of green consumers is both necessary and sufficient. On the other hand,
the mere existence of responsible firms is not sufficient.
Lemma 1. In the presence of green consumers (i.e.: if µ > 0), ∀αH , αL , µ ∈
[0, 1], 0 < e∗L < e∗H < eF B .
Proof. In Figure 2 we report the ratio15 eH over eF B calculated by means of equation (18). It can be easily seen that it is always positive but less than 1. Moreover,
given that λ∗ is always strictly higher than 1, e∗L is always less than e∗H for µ > 0.
Figure 2: e∗H /eF B

This lemma allows us to conclude that, even if consumers and producers were
fully responsible, the market equilibrium will not correspond to the first best allocation: both the responsible firms never adopt an efficient level of clean-up.
Moreover the allocation of the aggregate abatement is not cost-effective because
in equilibrium the two responsible firms never adopt the same level of clean-up
and so their marginal costs differ.
In order to analyze how the degree of responsibility of consumers and producers affects the overall efficiency of the abatement activity we can now conduct
15

Figure 2 is plotted under the assumption that µ = 1, so it indicates the maximum values that
the ratio eH over eF B can assume.

13
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some comparative statics. Note that given equations (17) and (18) there is a positive relationship between the social capital index and the equilibrium level of
clean-up of both the responsible firms. The following lemma states how the degree of firms’ social responsibility influences their equilibrium level of clean-up:
Lemma 2. In the presence of green consumers (i.e.: if µ > 0):
1. e∗L is monotonically increasing in αL and αH , ∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1];
2. e∗H is monotonically increasing in αH , while it is monotonically increasing
(decreasing) in αL if αH is close to 0 (1). For intermediate values of αH ,
eH is not monotone in αL ;
3. E T ∗ = e∗H +e∗L is monotonically increasing in αL and αH , ∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The influence of the degree of CSR of both the responsible firms on their
equilibrium levels of abatement are proved by means of the contour plots shown
in Figure 3. The left-hand side shows that e∗L has iso-curves negatively sloped and
that it reaches its maximum value in the point (αH = 1, αL = 1). This means
that e∗L is monotone increasing in both αH and αL . On the other hand, the central
contour plot shows that the iso-curve of e∗H are decreasing in correspondence of
low values of αH and increasing for high values of αH . Moreover, e∗H reaches
its maximum value in correspondence of the point αH = 1, αL = 0. This prove
that a higher αH always implies a higher e∗H , while the influence of αL on e∗H
depends on the value of αH . Finally, the right-hand side shows that the sum of
firms’ abatement activities in equilibrium is monotone increasing in both αH and
αL . Indeed, the iso-curves are negatively sloped and the maximum is reached in
the point (αH = 1, αL = 1).
Therefore increments in the degree of responsibility of a firm always entails an
increase of its own abatement activity. On the other hand increments in the degree
of responsibility of the rival firm may not have a clear-cut effect for both firms.
Indeed, it is always true that the higher αH , the higher e∗L , while an increment of
αL may both increase and decrease e∗H , depending on the level of αH . This result
is due to the different sign that the cross derivative of JH can assume. As seen
above, when firm H carries out a sufficiently high (low) degree of CSR, then its
best response is decreasing (increasing) in the level of clean-up of firm L. As a
consequence, given that an increment of αL increases e∗L , we have that when αH
is sufficiently high (low) e∗H is decreasing (increasing) in αL . However, the total
level of abatement is monotonically increasing in the degree of CSR of each firm.
14
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Figure 3: Contour Plot of e∗L and e∗H

Note: the lighter colors are associated with higher values.

3.2

The Social Welfare

In the case of fixed costs of clean-up, the social welfare defined in equation (3)
can be rewritten as:
W =

k
ρT e∗i − (e∗i )2 .
2
i=H,L
X

(19)

Proposition 1. The social welfare is monotonically increasing in µ, αL and αH ,
∀ µ, αH , αL ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We can write the variation of W with respect to a generic exogenous parameter z as:
X
∂W
∂e∗
=
(ρT − ke∗i ) i .
∂z
∂z
i=H,L

(20)

Given Lemma 1, e∗i < eF B ⇔ ρT − ke∗i > 0. Therefore, the sign of the
derivatives of the social welfare with respect to an exogenous parameter will depend only on how such parameter affects the equilibrium level of clean-up of both
∂e∗
firms. If ∂zi has the same sign, ∀i = L, H, then also ∂W
will have that sign.
∂z
Therefore, given equations (17) and (18) and Lemma 2, the social welfare is everywhere increasing in µ and αH . As far as αL is concerned, rearranging equation
20 we obtain:

15
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∗

∂E T
∂e∗
∂W
= (ρT − ke∗L )
+ k(e∗H − e∗L ) L .
(21)
∂z
∂z
∂z
Applying Lemma 2 to formula 21 we can conclude that the social welfare is
monotone increasing also in αL . The following contour plot (Figure 4) confirms
that the social welfare has its global maximum in (αH = 1, αL = 1).
Figure 4: Contour Plot of W (αH , αL )

This result is in line with Garcia Gallego and Georgantzis (2009), who had
already shown that, in the uncovered market configuration, the social welfare is
increasing in consumers’ WTP. However, in this paper we show that the social
welfare is also increasing in the degree of CSR of both the responsible firms.
Corollary 1. The highest social welfare is attained when µ = 1, αL = 1 and
αH = 1, but it does not correspond to the first best solution.
Proof. Proposition 1 ensures that the maximum welfare associated to the market
equilibrium is reached when both µ, αL and αH have their maximum value. In
such case, the social welfare calculated by means of equation (19) is equal to
T 2
0, 4366 (ρ k ) . However, if the level of abatement of both the responsible firms
T 2
T
was ρk , i.e. its first best level, then the social welfare would be equal to (ρ k ) .
16
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Therefore in this case the social welfare attained in equilibrium is only the 43, 66%
of its first best level.
Therefore, the market equilibrium never achieves the first best solution, even
if both consumers and producers behave as fully responsible agents. The inefficiency of the market equilibrium is due to two different reasons: firstly, the
clean-up of both the responsible firms is always lower than the first best level and
consequently total abatement is below its optimal level. Moreover, the allocation
of total abatement is not cost effective because it is not equally shared between the
two responsible firms, whatever their degree of altruistic CSR (both these facts are
emphasized in Lemma 1).
To sum up, when the clean-up activity of the responsible firms is only implicitly linked to their production, the efficient level of the abatement is never reached
in equilibrium (Corollary 1). However, an increase of both firms’ CSR and consumers’ WTP have always a positive effect on the social welfare (Proposition 1).
In the next section we shall show that even this result is not guaranteed when the
clean-up activity is explicitly associated to the production level (i.e. when both
benefits and costs of the cleaning technology are variable).
0
0
, αL0 ),
; then W (αH , αL ) > W (αH
Proposition 2. Assume that αH = αL0 > αL = αH
∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1].

Proof. Let us analyze the contour plot of the Welfare (Figure 4). It is straightforward that if we consider both a point such that αH > αL and its symmetric point
with respect to the 45◦ line, the former is always associated to a higher social
welfare than the latter.
The existing literature regarding vertically differentiated duopolies has already
stressed the existence of two symmetric Nash equilibria at the quality stage. However, in the present model these two equilibria are asymmetric (if αH 6= αL ) given
the asymmetry in the firms’ objective functions. Proposition 2 states that the social welfare is always higher in the equilibrium in which the high quality firms is
at the same time the firm with the highest degree of CSR.
Thanks to Propositions 1 and 2 we can compare a standard duopoly, where
the firms are both profit maximizers, with a mixed duopoly, where a non-profit
producer competes with a profit maximizer firm. When the costs of the abatement
activity are only implicitly linked to the production level, then the presence of a
non-profit firm is always welfare improving, and from the social welfare standpoint it is preferable the equilibrium in which the non-profit firm carries out the
highest level of clean-up.
17
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4

Variable Costs of Clean-up

4.1

The Market Equilibrium

In this section we study the case of variable costs of clean-up, i.e. γ = 1. Firms’
objective function is:
Ji = πi

1−αi

ρ T e i xi

αi

,

i = L, H,

(22)

where:

k 2
(23)
πi = pi − ei xi , i = L, H,
2
and the market shares of each firm are still given by (9). In this case the prices affect not only firms’ profit but also the size of their positive externality. Therefore,
equilibrium prices are now dependent on the degree of CSR of both firms.
By computing the first derivatives of JH and JL with respect to prices and then
solving the system we obtain the following equations for the equilibrium prices:




2
2
+
2
θ̄(1
−
α
)(2
−
α
)(e
−
e
)
+
(1
−
α
)ke
e
(2
−
α
)ke
H
L
H
L
H
H
L
L
H
,
p∗H =
2[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]
p∗L =

eL [(1 − αL )ke2H + (2 − αH )keL eH + 2θ̄(1 − αH )(1 − αL )(eH − eL )]
,
2[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]

yielding profits:
θ̄
πH = (1 − αH )(eH − eL )x2H ,
β
πL = (1 − αL )(eH − eL )

eL 2 θ̄
x ,
eH L β

(24)
(25)

where:


βeH (2 − αL )(2θ̄ − keH ) − keL )
xH =
,
2θ̄[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]


βeH (1 − αH )(2θ̄ − keL ) + keH )
xL =
.
2θ̄[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]

(26)
(27)

18
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We can now include equations (24) and (25) in the generic equation (22) and
derive the first order conditions of the first stage obtaining the following system
of equations:
∂JH
∂xH eH − αH eL
= 0 ⇔ (2 − αH )(eH − eL )
+
xH = 0;
∂eH
∂eH
eH
∂JL
eL ∂xL eH − 2eL + αL eL
= 0 ⇔ (2 − αL )(eH − eL )
+
xL = 0.
∂eL
eH ∂eL
eH

(28)

(29)

Moorthy (1988) has already shown that when vertically differentiated firms
behave as profit maximizers, their reaction functions are both positively sloped
and so their quality choices are strategic complements. However, it is easy to
check that if the high quality firm is a non-profit firm, i.e. when αH = 1, its
best response function is negatively sloped16 while the best response function of
firm L is still positively sloped. Therefore we may not record neither strategic
complementarity nor strategic substitutability, as in the fixed costs case.
The system given by equations (28) and (29) can have at maximum one acceptable solution (i.e.: such that e∗H ≥ e∗L ). When one solution exists, such solution corresponds to the equilibrium levels of marginal clean-up of both firms17 ,
which depend on the parameters αH and αL . The solutions in the closed form
are not analytically feasible. However, some clear results emerges when one of
the duopolists is a non-profit firm and it produces either the high-quality or the
low-quality good.
Proposition 3. If αL = 1, then at the first stage no Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. In this case the market shares of the responsible firms can be rewritten by
substituting αL = 1 in formula (26) and (27). We obtain:
xH =

β(2θ̄ − keL − keH )
,
2θ̄(2 − αH )

(30)

16

Indeed, in such case the cross derivative of the objective function of firm H is equal to
βk
− 2θ̄(2−α
.
L)
17
In the technical appendix it is shown that in correspondence of the unique acceptable solution
second order conditions hold also in the case of variable costs. However, not all the candidate
solutions are valid because, as reported in the technical appendix, in some cases some firm has an
incentive to leapfrog the "equilibrium" level of marginal abatement of its rival.
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xL =

β[(1 − αH )(2θ̄ − keL ) + keH ]
.
2θ̄(2 − αH )

(31)

The derivatives of JL with respect to eL is equal to:
∂JL
∂xL
= eL
+ xL = 2(1 − αH )(θ̄ − keL ) + keH
∂eL
∂eL

(32)

From equation ((30)) we can deduce that xH ≥ 0 ⇔ keL ≤ θ̄. This fact
implies that equation ((32)) is always strictly positive. Consequently, at the first
stage the firm L wants to choose eL = eH , the maximum level of marginal abatement under the constraint that eL must be weakly lower than eH . On the other
hand, if αH < 1, the firm H always want to choose eH > eL , because if eH = eL
its profit is equal to 0. Hence, when αL = 1 no Nash equilibrium exists at the first
stage.
Therefore, when one of the two responsible producers is a non-profit firm,
there is no equilibrium in which it chooses the low level of marginal abatement.
Indeed, in such case the firm L would mimic the choice of its competitor, while
the firm H would choose a level of marginal abatement strictly higher than the
level of its rival.
As a consequence, in the presence of a non-profit firm, the only Nash equilibrium can be characterized by substituting αH = 1 in equations ((28)) and ((29)).
Lemma 3. If β > 0, θ̄ > 0, and αH = 1, then in equilibrium:
1. e∗L is monotonically increasing in θ̄ and αL , decreasing in k and independent of β;
2. x∗L is monotonically increasing in β and αL and independent of θ̄ and k;
3. e∗H is monotonically increasing in θ̄, decreasing in k and αL and independent of β;
4. x∗H is monotonically increasing in β, decreasing in αL and independent of
θ̄ and k;
5. E T ∗ = e∗H x∗H +e∗L x∗L is monotonically increasing in β and θ̄ and decreasing
in k and αL .
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Proof. Note that if β > 0, θ̄ > 0, αH = 1 and αL ∈ [0, 1) then the solution of the
system identifies the following equilibrium levels of marginal abatement:
e∗L =

2(2 − αL ) θ̄
;
9 − 8αL + 2αL2 k

(33)

e∗H =

2(2 − αL )2 θ̄
.
9 − 8αL + 2αL2 k

(34)

Substituting these solutions in equations (27) and (26) the following equilibrium market shares are achieved:
x∗L =

β(2 − αL )
9 − 8αL + 2αL2

(35)

x∗H =

β(2 − αL )2
9 − 8αL + 2αL2

(36)

It is straightforward to check that parameters β, θ̄ and k affect e∗L , x∗L , e∗H ,
x∗H and E T ∗ in the way stated in the proposition. As far as the impact of the the
degree of CSR of the low-quality firm on firms’ marginal abatement choices and
on their market shares, the results stated in the proposition stem from the following
∗
∗
∂e∗H
∂e∗
∂x∗
2α2L −8αL +7
2θ̄ ∂xL
2θ̄ ∂xH
>
0;
derivatives: ∂αLL = βk
> 0; ∂αLL = β (9−8α
=
< 0;
2
2
αL
∂α
βk
α
L
L
L +2α )
∂x∗H
∂αL

2(2−αL )
= −β (9−8α
2 2 < 0;
L +2α )
L

∂E T ∗
∂αL

L

=

4β θ̄
2αL −4
2k (9−8αL +2α2L )4

< 0.

Therefore, in the presence of a non-profit firm, the only Nash equilibrium is
characterized by the fact that the other firm always adopts the lowest level of
quality (i.e.: marginal abatement). Moreover, if this low quality firm assigns a
higher weight to its CSR then its positive externality increases. However, this
effect is counterbalanced by the reduction of the positive externality of the high
quality firm. This result is coherent with the slope of the best response function
of firm H. If firm L becomes more careful with the environmental impact of
its production, it will increase its level of abatement, but at the same time, it will
reduce its mark-up, increasing its supply. On the other hand, firm H cannot reduce
its price without reducing its level of clean-up because it always charges a price
equal to its marginal costs. Hence, firm H finds it convenient to decrease its level
of abatement in order to limit the reduction of its market share. The last statement
shows us that the aggregate effect of an increase in αL entails a reduction of the
total abatement.

21

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 582 [2011]

Figure 5: Nash equilibrium existence

More general results regarding the market equilibrium in the presence of two
responsible firms can be obtained through numerical calculations. Figure 5 generalizes Proposition 3 identifying in the shaded region the set of couples (αH , αL )
in which a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) fails to exist. Indeed, in such
cases, firm H would have an incentive to leapfrog18 firm L by choosing a level of
abatement lower than e∗L (αH , αL ) in order to increase its market share and its total
abatement. Consequently, at the first stage we can have zero, one or two Nash
equilibria, depending on the weight that both the responsible firms assign to their
profit. Making the symmetry of the shaded region with respect to the bisectrix
we can identify three different regions: when the shaded region and its symmetric
region coincide no Nash equilibrium exists. For all the other couples of values of
(αi , αj ) contained in the shaded region only a Nash equilibrium exists, in which
αH > αL . Finally, for the couples of (αi , αj ) which are contained nor in the
shaded region nor in its symmetric counterpart, two Nash equilibria exist.
Hence, if both the firms assign a high weight to the positive externality associated to their own production, the outcome of their strategic interaction is unpredictable. However, when a Nash equilibrium exists, we can analyze through
numerical calculations how the market equilibrium is affected by consumers’ and
firms’ degree of responsibility. It is possible to verify that both e∗L and e∗H are
linearly increasing in kθ̄ and independent of β, while both x∗L and x∗H are linearly
increasing in β and independent of θ̄ and k. As far as the impact of firms’ degree
18

The numerical calculations are available upon request.
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of responsibility on market equilibrium we resume the main observations in the
following lemma:
Lemma 4. When a Nash equilibrium exists, the following properties hold:
1. e∗L is monotonically increasing in αL , while it is increasing (decreasing) in
αH only when αL is sufficiently low (high). For intermediate values of αL ,
e∗L is (almost) constant. x∗L is monotone increasing in αL and monotone decreasing in αH . Finally, e∗L x∗L is monotone increasing in αL and monotone
decreasing in αH .
2. e∗H is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in αH only when αL is sufficiently low (high). For intermediate values of αL , e∗H is at first increasing
and then decreasing. At the same time, e∗H is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in αL only when αH is sufficiently low (high). For intermediate
values of αH , e∗H is at first decreasing and then increasing. x∗H is monotone increasing in αH and monotone decreasing in αL . Finally, e∗H x∗H is
monotone increasing in αH and monotone decreasing in αL .
3. E T ∗ = e∗H x∗H + e∗L x∗L is monotone increasing (decreasing) in αH if αL is
sufficiently low (high) and monotone increasing (decreasing) in αL if αH is
sufficiently low (high).
4. λ∗ = e∗H /e∗L is always monotone decreasing in αL while it is monotone
decreasing in αH only if αL is sufficiently high. When αL is low, λ∗ is first
increasing and then decreasing in αH .
Proof. See the 3D plots in Figure 6.
Hence, we can observe that the equilibrium levels of per unit abatement are
affected in different ways by firms’ degree of responsibility. At the same time,
firms’ market shares and their total abatement are always increasing in their own
degree of CSR, and decreasing in the degree of responsibility of the rival firm.
The overall impact on the aggregate level of clean-up can be various. Indeed, an
increase in the degree of responsibility of one firm can either increase or decrease
the aggregate clean-up depending on the degree of responsibility of the other firm.
Finally, an increase in the degree of responsibility of firm L makes the allocation
of the abatement activity more cost effective (i.e. it decreases the value of λ∗ ),
while an increase in the degree of responsibility of firm H has not always the
same effect on λ∗ .
23
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Lemma 5. When an equilibrium exists, e∗H S eF B and e∗L S eF B , depending on
the specific values of θ̄, αL , αH . At the same time, ρT − k2 e∗i > 0, ∀i = L, H,
∀θ̄, αL , αH .
Proof. See the graph of e∗H and e∗L in Figure 6. When β, θ̄ and k are put equal
to 1, there are couples (αH , αL ) for which e∗H and/or e∗L are higher than 0.5. As
a consequence, given the linear proportionality to θ̄, when maximum consumers’
WTP is close to its maximum value (i.e. 2ρT ) both the responsible firms may exert
T
a level of abatement higher than the first best level (i.e. ρk ). At the same time, the
graph of e∗H and e∗L in Figure 6 show that both the equilibrium levels of clean-up
never assume a value higher than kθ̄ . Hence, the inequality contained in the lemma
follows.
Therefore, contrarily to what happens in the fixed costs case, when the costs
are variable in equilibrium both firms may choose to exert a level of abatement
inefficiently high (i.e. higher than the first best level). Hence, the statements of
Lemma 4 and 5 do not allow any clear deduction with regard to the influence on
the social welfare of a higher degree of responsibility by part of consumers or
of a single firm. Indeed, a higher degree of responsibility in the population of
green consumers always increases the aggregate abatement, but it may induce the
responsible firms to adopt an inefficiently high level of marginal abatement. At the
same time, an increase in the degree of CSR of one firm has not a clear-cut effect
on the aggregate abatement and on the cost-effectiveness of the allocation of such
activity. We then devote next paragraph to the analysis of how the responsibility
of consumers and firms affect the social welfare.

4.2

The Social Welfare

In the case of variable costs of clean-up, the social welfare defined in equation (3)
can be rewritten as:

X
k ∗ 2 ∗
T ∗
(37)
W =
ρ ei − (ei ) xi .
2
i=H,L
Proposition 4. The social welfare function is monotone increasing in β and con2
cave in θ̄ (i.e.: ∂∂ θ̄W2 < 0). Its partial (first) derivative with respect to θ̄ is never
monotone.
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Proof. In this case the variation of W with respect to a generic exogenous parameter z is:

∗
X
k ∗ ∗ ∂x∗i
∂W
T
∗ ∗ ∂ei
T
=
(ρ − kei )xi
+ (ρ − ei )ei
.
∂z
∂z
2
∂z
i=H,L
Consequently,
Lemma 5) and
Given that

∂x∗i
∂β
∂x∗i
∂ θ̄

∂W
∂β

is surely positive given that

∂e∗i
∂β

= 0, (ρT − k2 e∗i ) > 0 (see

> 0, ∀i = L, H.
= 0 and

∂ 2 e∗i
∂ θ̄2

= 0 we obtain that:
X  ∂ei 2
∂ 2W
= −k
x∗i
<0
∂ θ̄2
∂
θ̄
i=H,L
∂e∗

∂x∗

Hence, W is concave in θ̄. Furthermore, as ∂ θ̄i > 0 and ∂ θ̄i = 0, we can note
depends on the sign of (ρT − ke∗i ), ∀i = L, H. Consequently,
that the sign of ∂W
∂ θ̄
when θ̄ is close to 0 (2ρT ) both e∗H and e∗L are lower (higher) than eF B and W is
increasing (decreasing) in θ̄. Therefore, W is never monotone in θ̄.
As far as the pattern of W with respect to αL and αH , it is impossible to derive
analytical results. However, using numerical simulations, in Figure 7 we show
that W can be both increasing and decreasing in firms’ degree of responsibility,
depending on the specific values of αL , αH and θ̄.
Therefore, in the variable costs case, the impact of αH and αL on the social
welfare depends crucially on their values and on the value of θ̄. In some cases a
higher degree of responsibility of one firm can harm the social welfare. For instance, the social welfare turn out to be monotonically decreasing in αL when αH
is very high and θ̄ is very low. At the same time, the social welfare is monotonically decreasing in αH when αL is very low and θ̄ is very high.
Three relevant results regarding the link between firms’ degree of responsibility and the social welfare attained in equilibrium are emphasized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 5. The highest social welfare is attained when β = 1, θ̄ ' 1, 463ρT ,
αH = 1 and αL ' 0, 85, and it does not correspond to the first best solution.
Proof. The maximum of W can be obtained through numerical calculations. In
T 2
correspondence of such values W = 0.33783 (ρ k ) . If all the existing firms could
adopt a level of abatement equal to the first best level the social welfare would
25
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T 2

be equal to 0.5 (ρ k ) . Therefore, when the abatement cost are explicitly linked to
sales, the maximum social welfare achievable in equilibrium is only the 0, 67% of
its first best level.
Proposition 6. If θ̄ is very high then social welfare is higher in a standard duopoly
than in a mixed duopoly.
Proof. Thanks to Figure 5 we know that in the presence of a non-profit firm and of
a profit-maximizing only a Nash equilibrium exists, in which the former chooses
the high level of abatement and the latter the low level. Observing the third graph
in Figure 7 we can note that when θ̄ is very high, W (0, 0) > W (1, 0). Therefore
social welfare is higher in a standard duopoly (i.e. in the presence of two profitmaximizing firms) than in a mixed duopoly (i.e. in the presence a non-profit firm
and a profit-maximizing firm)
0
. There are cases in which
Proposition 7. Assume that αH = αL0 > αL = αH
0
0
W (αH , αL ) < W (αH , αL ).

Proof. Observing the third graph in Figure 7 we can note that when θ̄ is very
high, the social welfare in W (0, 0) is decreasing in αH and increasing in αL . As a
consequence, W (y, 0) < W (0, y) for any y strictly positive and close to 0.
Hence, when the abatement costs are proportional to firms’ sales the conclusions are quite more confusing than in the fixed costs case. First of all, a higher degree of responsibility of consumers’ and/or firms may decrease the social welfare.
Moreover, the presence of a no-profit firm competing with a profit-maximizing
firm may harm social welfare. Consequently is not always reasonable for consumers and share-holders to sacrifice their private utility in order to voluntarily
contribute to the environmental protection. Finally, when two Nash equilibria
exists, there are cases in which the social welfare is higher when the more responsible firm produces the low (environmental) quality good. Therefore in such cases
the firm with some degree of altruism should choose a level of abatement lower
than its profit-maximizing rival.

5

Conclusions

In this paper we investigate how the market equilibrium is affected by the presence
of green consumers and responsible firms. We have introduced a model where
some consumers care about the environmental impact of goods they buy and some
26
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firms, following a multidimensional objective, weigh together the maximization
of both their profit and their abatement activity. Our analysis has focused mainly
on the effects associated to exogenous minor changes in aggregate consumers’
willingness to pay for cleaner goods or in the degree of firms’ social responsibility.
In accordance with the existing literature, we have found that the presence of
green consumers is sufficient to induce some firms to overcomply the minimum
environmental standard. However we have also shown that green consumers are
also necessary. Indeed, even if firms want to maximize their abatement effort,
they would be forced to employ the standard technology if in the market nobody
is willing to pay an extra-premium for their environment friendly products.
A second result is that in our model the nature of the abatement cost function
influences how a higher level of responsibility of both producers and consumers
affects the efficiency of aggregate clean-up. If the costs of the cleaning process
are fixed, then social welfare is monotone increasing in consumers’ WTP and in
firms’ CSR. On the other hand, if the abatement costs are variable, social welfare
may be reduced by an increase of consumers’ WTP and by a higher degree of
firms’ CSR. Therefore we cannot take for granted that a higher responsibility is
associated to a higher welfare. Moreover, if the abatement costs are fixed social
welfare is always higher in a mixed than in a standard duopoly. Conversely, when
the costs are variable, social welfare may be reduced by the presence of a nonprofit firm.
Finally, we have found that in both cases, a full responsibility of consumers
and producers is sufficient neither to implement the first best level of aggregate clean-up, nor to achieve a cost effective allocation of the abatement activity. Hence, the existence of individuals who take care of the environment in their
market decisions is usually a good news, but it cannot be considered a perfect
substitute for environmental regulation.
Future research should extend our analysis in order to check the robustness
of our results under different assumptions. For instance, firms could compete in
a different market form: we could assume that one firm is a Stackelberg leader,
and/or that the number of responsible firms is endogenous. Moreover, responsible
firms could maximize other kind of objective functions. Finally, firms’ degree of
CSR could be endogenous: in such case we should analyze the dynamic properties
of the interaction between green consumers and responsible firms.
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6

Technical Appendix

In this appendix we want to prove that at each stage the pair of candidate equilibrium prices or qualities (i.e. the solutions of the system given by the first order conditions stemming from firms’ maximization problems) represents a Nash
equilibrium. For this purpose we need to show that i) second order conditions are
satisfied, and that ii) the low (high) quality firm has no incentive to leapfrog its
rival by choosing a level of abatement higher than e∗H (lower than e∗L ).
We start by introducing the following lemma: let Ji be an objective function
given by the weighted product of two different functions: Ji = [πi (zi )]1−αi [Ei (zi )]αi
Lemma 6. If both πi and Ei are log-concave in zi , then the solution of the first
order condition, zi∗ , represents a local maximum.
Proof. We recall that the solution of a maximization problem is invariant wrt
monotone transformation of the objective function, so:
max[πi (zi )]1−αi [Ei (zi )]αi ≡ max log[πi (zi )]1−αi [Ei (zi )]αi ≡
zi

zi

≡ max(1 − αi ) log[πi (zi )] + αi log[Ei (zi )]
zi

Hence, if both πi and Ei are log-concave in zi , then the second order condition of
the maximization problem holds.
Proposition 8. At each stage the solutions of first order conditions represent always local maxima.
Proof. In order to guarantee that the solution of each first order condition is indeed
a local maximum we need to prove that second order conditions always hold.
Thanks to Lemma 6 we have to show that at each stage the profit and the positive
externality are log-concave in each firm’s strategic choice.
As far as the fixed costs case is concerned, we know from the existing literature
(see for instance Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) that each firm’s profit function
is concave in firm’s price strategy at the second stage (whatever the quality equilibrium) and in each firm’s quality choice at the first stage. However, concavity of
the profit functions imply also their log-concavity. At the same time, the positive
externality of each firm is equal to ei which is obviously log-concave in itself.
With regard to the variable costs case, the log-concavity of firms’ objective
function is shown below.
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• Price stage - Using formulas (23) and (9) we obtain:

∂ 2 log pH − k2 e2H
∂ 2 log[πH ]
∂ 2 log xH
=
+
;
∂pH 2
∂pH 2
∂pH 2
1
1
−
=−
2 < 0.

2
θ̄(eH − eL ) − pH + pL
pH − k2 e2H
∂ 2 log[eH xH ]
1
=−
2 < 0.
2
∂pH
θ̄(eH − eL ) − pH + pL

∂ 2 log pL − k2 e2L
∂ 2 log xL
∂ 2 log[πL ]
=
+
;
∂pL 2
∂pL 2
∂pL 2
1
e2H
=−
−
< 0.

2
(pH eL − pL eH )2
pL − k2 e2L
e2H
∂ 2 log[eL xL ]
=
−
< 0.
∂pL 2
(pH eL − pL eH )2
• Quality stage - Recalling formulas (24) and (25) we can write:
log πH = log (1 − αH )(eH − eL ) + 2 log xH ;
log πL = log (1 − αL )(eH − eL ) + log eL − log eH + 2 log xL ;
where, thanks to formulas (26) and (27) we can know that:
log xH = log βeH + log [(2 − αL )(2θ̄ − keH ) − keL ]−
− log 2θ̄[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ];
log xL = log βeH + log [(1 − αH )(2θ̄ − keL ) + keH ]−
− log 2θ̄[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ];
Consequently we can calculate the following derivatives:
1
1
[(2 − αL )k]2
∂ 2 log[πH ]
=
−
−
−
2
−
∂eH 2
(eH − eL )2 e2H
[(2 − αL )(2θ̄ − keH ) − keL ]2
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )]2
−2
< 0;
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]2
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∂ 2 log[πL ]
1
1
[(1 − αH )k]2
=
−
−
−
2
−
∂eL 2
(eH − eL )2 e2L
[(1 − αH )(2θ̄ − keL ) + keH ]2
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )]2
−2
< 0;
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]2
[(2 − αL )k]2
2
∂ 2 log[eH xH ]
=− 2 −2
−
∂eH 2
eH
[(2 − αL )(2θ̄ − keH ) − keL ]2
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )]2
−2
< 0;
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]2
1
[(1 − αH )k]2
∂ 2 log[eL xL ]
=
−
−
2
−
∂eL 2
e2L
[(1 − αH )(2θ̄ − keL ) + keH ]2
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )]2
−2
< 0.
[(2 − αH )(2 − αL )eH − (1 − αH )(1 − αL )eL ]2

Finally, in order to guarantee that (e∗L , e∗H ) is indeed a Nash equilibrium we
have to check that the firm choosing e∗L has no incentive to "leapfrog" its rival by
choosing a quality higher than e∗H . Likewise, we have to verify that firm choosing
the highest quality, e∗H , has no incentive to deviate by producing a quality lower
than e∗L . Formally, we must check that:
JL (e∗L , e∗H ) > JH (e∗1 , e∗H ) ∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1],

(38)

where e∗1 in the fixed costs case is the solution of equation (13) (for the variable
costs case we have to consider equation (28)) when eL = e∗H , and:
JH (e∗H , e∗L ) > JL (e∗2 , e∗L ),

∀αH , αL ∈ [0, 1],

(39)

where e∗2 in the fixed costs case is the solution of equation 14 (for the variable
costs case we have to consider equation (29)) when eH = e∗L
From the numerical calculations we can observe that in the fixed costs case no
firm has an incentive to leapfrog its rival in equilibrium. However, in the variable
costs case, firm H has an incentive to leapfrog firm L when αL is sufficiently high
and αH is sufficiently low (see Figure 5). The file with the numerical calculations
is available upon request.
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Figure 6: Illustration of Lemma 4

Figures are drawn assuming θ̄ = 1, k = 1 and β = 1.
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Figure 7: W (αH , αL )

Social welfare pattern when θ̄ = 0.2; 1; 1.8.
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